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Abstract
A common critique of globalization is that it leads to a race to the bottom. Speci￿-
cally, it is assumed that multinationals invest in countries with lower regulatory standards
and that countries competitively undercut each other￿ s standards in response. This paper
tests this hypothesis and ￿nds empirical support for both propositions. First, a reduction
in employment protection rules leads to an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI).
Furthermore, changes in employment protection legislation have a larger impact on the
relatively mobile types of FDI. Second, there is evidence that countries are competitively
undercutting each other￿ s labor market standards.
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A frequent critique of globalization is that it can lead to a race to the bottom, where
countries lower their labor standards, environmental standards, or tax rates in order to
attract foreign capital. More speci￿cally, the race to the bottom hypothesis hinges on two
important propositions.2 First, it is assumed that multinational enterprises (MNE) choose
to invest in countries with less restrictive standards. Second, it is assumed that foreign
countries competitively undercut each other￿ s standards in order to attract FDI. While these
are common fears associated with globalization, there is relatively little empirical evidence
supporting either of these propositions. This analysis tests these predictions by examining
the impact of employment protection legislation on inward FDI and by examining the impact
of labor market standards in other countries on the employment protection legislation in
the foreign host country. While this paper ￿nds evidence of a race to the bottom, ultimately
whether this is a undesirable outcome is a normative question that depends on one￿ s view
of labor market restrictions.
Anecdotal evidence suggests there is an important relationship between FDI and la-
bor standards. For instant, in 1993, Hoover, an American multinational ￿rm, relocated a
vacuum cleaner plant from Dijon, France to Cambuslang, Scotland. At the time, Britain
was encouraging inward investment by highlighting it￿ s relatively ￿ exible hiring and ￿ring
rules. In addition, William Foust, president of Hoover Europe, said that the signi￿cantly
higher non-wage labor costs in France relative to Scotland was a factor in the company￿ s
decision to relocate.3 The French government indicated that this was a case of "social
dumping" in which the competitive undercutting of labor standards was used to attract
foreign investment and asked the European Commission to investigate.4 This and other
highly publicized cases led to concern among European Union o¢ cials that countries were
2The origins of the phrase race to the bottom are often traced to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in Liggatt v Lee where he describes how ￿rms were formed in U.S. "states
where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive" which led to a race "not of diligence but of laxity"
(Louis K. Liggett CO v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 1933). William Cary was the ￿rst to use the term "race to the
bottom" in 1974 in reference to the erosion of corporate standards in Delaware as a means to attract ￿rms
to the state (Cary 1974).
3"Social dumping - hardly an open and shut case: The arguments about switching jobs between countries
are not so simple" by David Goodhart, Financial Times, February 4, 1993.
4"French promise to make Hoover pay dear" by David Buchan, Financial Times, February 4, 1993.
1lowering labor standards in order to attract large multinational companies.5 This paper
examines whether this and other stories are indicative of a more general race to the bottom
in employment protection rules.
A preliminary check of the data seems to support these anecdotes. Foreign direct in-
vestment has increased substantially in the last twenty ￿ve years. For instance, the share
of U.S. direct investment in OECD countries relative to U.S. gross domestic product has
increased from 4.3% in 1985 to 14.5% in 2007 (see Figure 1).6 In addition, labor market
regulations, such as hiring and ￿ring restrictions, have decreased over the last twenty ￿ve
years. For instance, employment protection rules in OECD countries have decreased from
an average of 2.45 in 1985 to 2.04 in 2007 (see Figure 1). Certainly there are many other
factors that can in￿ uence both FDI and labor standards and thus the goal of this paper is
to examine to what extent these trends in the data are related.
According to the ￿rst proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis, a reduction in
labor market restrictions will increase FDI. As employment protection rules become less
strict, the cost of doing business falls in that foreign country, and thus multinationals will
shift production activities to that country. Furthermore, the response of multinationals to
employment restrictions likely depends on the type of FDI. Relatively more mobile types
of FDI will have a greater ability to respond to changes in labor market restrictions than
FDI that is tied to a speci￿c location. For instance, vertical FDI, which is motivated by
the desire to take advantage of low foreign factor prices, can be relocated to less expensive
locations relatively easily. However, horizontal FDI, which is motivated by the desire to
access a foreign market, needs to be near the foreign consumers and is thus less mobile.
The second key proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is that countries lower
their labor standards in order to undercut their competitors and attract FDI. As the average
labor standards in other foreign countries decreases, the foreign host country will lower
their own labor standards in response. Thus, the average employment restrictions in other
foreign countries should have a positive impact on the employment protection rules in
the host country. While the intuition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is relatively
5"EU looks to extend laws on worker consultation," by Caroline Southey, Financial Times, September
23, 1996.
6If non-OECD countries are included, the increase is even larger.
2straightforward, there is little empirical evidence to support either proposition.
This paper examines these predictions using data on FDI by U.S. multinationals and
data on employment restrictions in twenty six foreign countries which collectively account
for over three quarters of U.S. outward FDI. Focusing on U.S. FDI is appealing because
it ￿xes parent country characteristics that may in￿ uence FDI. In addition, using detailed
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on foreign a¢ liate sales of U.S. multi-
nationals allows horizontal, export-platform, and vertical FDI to be separately identi￿ed.
The measure of employment protection used in this analysis is a composite index of hiring
and ￿ring costs obtained from the OECD. This provides a consistent and objective measure
of di⁄erences in employment protection legislation across countries and over time. Span-
ning twenty six countries and twenty three years, the data set provides the scale and scope
necessary to examine both propositions of the race to the bottom hypothesis.7
To test the ￿rst proposition, the impact of employment protection on FDI is estimated
after controlling for time ￿xed e⁄ects, country ￿xed e⁄ects, and a wide variety of foreign
country characteristics that are likely to in￿ uence FDI, including size, trade costs, skill level,
corporate tax rates, institutional quality, and wages. This alleviates concerns that changes
in employment protection rules could be inadvertently capturing other types of institutional
or economic changes which are correlated with FDI. This relationship is estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS), instrumental variables (IV), and a dynamic panel generalized
methods of moments (Arellano-Bond GMM). The results are remarkably robust to all of the
estimation strategies and indicate that employment protection has a signi￿cant, negative
impact on the foreign a¢ liate sales of U.S. multinationals. This is consistent with the
prediction that a reduction in labor market restrictions will decrease the costs of production
in the host country and thus increase U.S. FDI to that foreign country.
Even more compelling is that the impact of employment protection varies across di⁄er-
ent types of FDI in the manner predicted. There is relatively little impact of employment
restrictions on a¢ liate sales to the local market (horizontal FDI) but a more signi￿cant im-
pact of employment restrictions on a¢ liate sales to other foreign countries (export-platform
7The lack of employment protection data for other countries, such as China and India, restricts the
sample. However, focusing on relatively similar OECD countries should, if anything, attenuate the results
and it should limit unobserved factors that may be correlated with FDI and employment protection.
3FDI). Finally, there is a large, negative, and signi￿cant impact of employment restrictions
on a¢ liates sales back the U.S. (vertical FDI) in all speci￿cations. These contrasting re-
sults, provide strong evidence that labor market restrictions have the largest e⁄ect on the
relatively more mobile types of FDI. Thus, there is evidence that FDI responds to labor
market restrictions and that this response is strongest among the most footloose types of
FDI. This veri￿es the ￿rst proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis and provides a
motivation for countries to lower their employment protection rules.
The second key proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is that countries com-
petitively undercut each other￿ s labor market standards in order to attract FDI. To test this
proposition, this paper examines whether host country employment protection legislation
depends on changes in labor market standards in other foreign countries. Competitor￿ s
labor market standards are quanti￿ed as a weighted average of employment protection in
other foreign countries. This average is calculated as an unweighted average, a weighted
average based on distance, and a weighted average based on a¢ liate sales. In addition the
results are estimated using three di⁄erent estimation strategies, including OLS, IV, and
Arellano-Bond GMM. The results indicate that employment restrictions in other foreign
countries has a signi￿cant positive impact on host country employment protection legis-
lation. As competitor￿ s lower their labor standards, the foreign host country responds by
lowering their own employment protection rules. This result is robust to all three weighting
schemes and all three estimation strategies. Thus, this paper ￿nds evidence supporting
both propositions of the race to the bottom hypothesis.
A number of extensions and robustness checks are also pursued. Speci￿cally, additional
results show that both ￿ring and hiring restriction have an important a⁄ect on FDI, with
the former having a larger negative impact than the latter. In addition, the competitive
undercutting of standards seems to be stronger with hiring restrictions. Both sets of results
presented in the paper are also robust to restricting the sample to just European countries.
Multinationals play a crucial role in the increasingly integrated global economy. For
instance, forty percent of all U.S. trade occurs within the boundaries of the ￿rm (U.S.
Census 2010). Understanding how multinationals decide where to locate production facilities
is crucial in explaining trade ￿ ows and understanding the implications of globalization more
4generally. The determinants of FDI have been studied extensively (Carr, Markusen, and
Maskus 2001, Markusen and Maskus 2002, Blonigen et al. 2007). These studies have
convincingly shown that foreign country characteristics such as GDP, skill level, trade costs,
investment costs, and distance are important determinants of FDI. While the idea that
multinationals are attracted to foreign countries with less restrictive labor standards is
intuitive, relatively little is actually known about whether this is an important determinant
of FDI. The results in this paper provide clear evidence that labor market restrictions have
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on FDI.
Research on labor market restrictions typically focuses on the implications for employ-
ment (Lazear 1990, Acemoglu and Angrist 2001, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005, Boeri and
Jimeno 2005) and for output (Besley and Burgess 2004). An important contribution of many
of these studies, relative to earlier work, is to look at within country variation using panel
data rather than simply making cross country comparisons. In this paper, I also control
for unobserved country characteristics but look at the global rami￿cations of employment
protection. Given the increasingly integrated world economy and the growing importance
of multinationals, it is also necessary to consider how employment restrictions will a⁄ect
FDI.
Brown, Deardor⁄, and Stern (1996) and Martin and Maskus (2001) examine the theo-
retical implications of international labor standards on trade and are skeptical of the race
to the bottom hypothesis. The few empirical studies that examine the race to the bottom
hypothesis typically just estimate the link between employment protection and FDI. For
instance, Rodrik (1996) and OECD (2000) ￿nd evidence that a decrease in labor standards
actually reduces FDI, contrary to the predictions of the race to the bottom hypothesis. In
surveys of the literature, Bhagwati (2007) and Brown, Deardor⁄, and Stern (2011) argue
that there is no evidence that multinationals are attracted to countries with lower labor
standards.
However, related studies, which are not explicit tests of the race to the bottom hypothe-
sis, ￿nd that less restrictive employment protection rules increase FDI (Gorg 2005, Dewit et
al. 2009, Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005, Benassy-Quere et al. 2007). While similar in spirit,
these papers typically rely on more subjective measures of hiring and ￿ring costs than the
5employment protection measured used in this analysis. Furthermore, none of these papers
examine the impact of labor market restrictions on di⁄erent types of FDI. An important
contribution of this paper is the ￿nding that the impact of labor market restrictions on FDI
depends crucially on the type of FDI. While Azemar and Desbordes (2010) also look at
di⁄erent types of FDI, their measure of employment protection has no annual variation. In
contrast, this paper exploits changes in labor market restrictions within a country over time.
The ability to control for country and year ￿xed e⁄ects and the ability to identify a causal
impact of employment protection on FDI using the IV and GMM estimation strategies
represent important contributions of this paper.
Tests of the race to the bottom hypothesis tend to focus on whether multinationals
invest in countries with lower regulatory standards. As mentioned, the evidence regarding
this ￿rst proposition is mixed. Tests of the second proposition of the race to the bottom
hypothesis are even rarer. While admittedly this is more di¢ cult to prove empirically,
it is an important component of the race to the bottom hypothesis. To the best of my
knowledge, this is the only paper to examine whether countries competitively undercut one
another￿ s labor standards. Thus, this is the ￿rst comprehensive empirical test of the race
to the bottom hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the propositions of
the race to the bottom hypothesis. The estimation strategy is described in Section 3, while
the data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. The results are discussed in
Section 5 and extensions are presented in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Race to the Bottom
2.1 Proposition 1
The ￿rst proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is that multinationals choose
where to invest based in part on the employment restrictions within the foreign country.
Less strict labor standards will reduce operating costs for the MNE and make investing in
that particular country more appealing. In addition, FDI that is relatively more mobile,
in the sense that it can be equally e⁄ective in a variety of di⁄erent countries, should be
6more responsive to labor restrictions. The reduction of employment protection rules will
lead the multinational to shift mobile types of FDI to that foreign host country. Thus, the
responsiveness of FDI to employment protection legislation will depend crucially on the
type of FDI.
Horizontal FDI occurs when a multinational invests in a country in order to access that
foreign market and avoid transport costs associated with exporting the good from home
(Markusen 1984). The MNE shifts the entire production process to the foreign country and
then sells the output to local consumers. Thus, the decision to pursue horizontal FDI de-
pends on a "proximity-concentration trade-o⁄" between the home and foreign country in
which the bene￿ts associated with being close to the foreign market need to be weighed
against the costs associated with setting up production activities abroad (Brainard 1997).
With horizontal FDI, the choice set facing the multinational is producing at home or pro-
ducing in the foreign country whose market they want to access. Since the goal of horizontal
FDI is to access a foreign market, there is little reason for a MNE to shift production activ-
ities from one foreign country to another. Thus, horizontal FDI will be the least sensitive
to employment protection legislation in the foreign country.
Export-platform FDI occurs when a multinational accesses a foreign market by setting
up an a¢ liate in a neighboring country and exporting to the desired country (Ekholm,
Forslid, and Markusen 2003, Yeaple 2003). The motivation is still to access a foreign market
but now one foreign a¢ liate can export to a variety of neighboring countries. Thus, the
multinational can access multiple markets with one well placed foreign a¢ liate. Under
export-platform FDI, the relevant choice set facing the MNE is to produce at home and
export or to produce in one of many potential host countries and export to multiple markets
within a region. Since there are more options available to the MNE, export-platform FDI
will be more sensitive to employment protection legislation than horizontal FDI.
Finally, vertical FDI occurs when multinationals invest in a country in order to take
advantage of low foreign factor prices and minimize costs (Helpman 1984). The MNE shifts
part of the production activities to the foreign a¢ liate and then ships the output back to the
home country for further processing or for ￿nal sales. Unlike horizontal and export-platform
FDI which need to be near a speci￿c foreign market, vertical FDI can be located in any
7foreign country regardless of location. The MNE simply chooses to invest in the country
that generates the greatest cost savings. If the costs associated with operating in one foreign
country decrease, the MNE can relocate production activities from other foreign locations
to that particular low cost country. Given that the motivation for vertical FDI is to take
advantage of low foreign factor prices, vertical FDI will be especially sensitive to changes in
the cost of production. Thus, relative to horizontal and export-platform FDI, vertical FDI
will be the most responsive to employment protection legislation.
The key prediction is that the more footloose the FDI, the more sensitive FDI will be to
changes in labor restrictions in the foreign country. As employment protection decreases in a
foreign country, multinational will be reluctant to shift horizontal FDI to that country from
other foreign countries since that would defeat the main motivation of accessing foreign
markets. However, with export-platform FDI, the multinational has the ability to shift
production to the less restrictive foreign country and still access other foreign markets.
Finally, with vertical FDI, the multinational has the ability to shift production from any
other foreign country, regardless of location, to the less restrictive country. The empirical
analysis that follows examines whether FDI responds to employment protection legislation
in this manner.
2.2 Proposition 2
The second proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is that countries competitively
undercut each other￿ s labor market standards in order to attract foreign investment. Given
that FDI is often associated with increases in production, capital stock, infrastructure, and
knowledge spillovers, attracting foreign investment is particularly appealing for many coun-
tries. If, according to proposition one, multinationals are attracted to countries with less
restrictive labor standards, then each country has an incentive to lower their employment
protection rules slightly below that of other countries. By undercutting the employment
standards in other foreign countries, each host country has the ability to lure FDI away
from its competitors. Thus, the second proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis
predicts that employment restrictions in a foreign country and the average labor standards
in other countries are positively related. Speci￿cally, as the weighted average of employment
8protection rules among a country￿ s competitors falls, the foreign country will reduce its own
employment protections in response. The analysis that follows discusses how this weighted
average is constructed and examines whether countries competitively undercut each other￿ s
labor standards.
3 Speci￿cation
To test proposition 1 and 2 of the race to the bottom hypothesis, this paper utilizes OLS,
IV, and Arellano-Bond GMM estimation strategies. Each method has its bene￿ts and
drawbacks, however ideally the results will be consistent across each of these speci￿cations.
3.1 Testing Proposition 1
The analysis begins by examining whether FDI is sensitive to changes in employment pro-
tection in the foreign host country. To test this ￿rst proposition of the race to the bottom
hypothesis, the following equation will be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS):
(1) FDIc;t = ￿1EPc;t￿1 + Xc;t￿1￿2 + ￿c + ￿t + ￿c;t
where FDIc;t is U.S. foreign direct investment into country c in year t. The variable
EPc;t￿1 is employment protection in foreign country c and Xc;t￿1 is a vector of control
variables that includes host country characteristics such as GDP, population, trade costs,
skill level, tax rate, investment costs, and wages. These independent variables are lagged to
account for the fact that multinationals cannot immediately adjust FDI in response to these
host country characteristics.8 The natural logarithm of all variables is used in the empirical
analysis which allows for a more intuitive interpretation of the results. Finally, ￿c and ￿t
are country and year ￿xed e⁄ects respectively.
Despite the inclusion of country and year ￿xed e⁄ects, the inclusion of a wide variety of
control variables, and lagging all the independent variables, there may be lingering endo-
8The results that follow are robust to using longer lags.
9geneity concerns.9 In order to identify a causal impact of employment protection on FDI,
this analysis will estimate equation (1) using an IV estimation strategy. This second empiri-
cal strategy uses the strength and political ideology of the ruling party and the unionization
density as instruments for employment protection legislation in the foreign host country. A
country that elects a relatively powerful liberal ruling party will be more likely to implement
labor market restrictions. In addition, a country may respond to a declining union presence
by implementing employment protection legislation.10 These instruments will identify vari-
ation in employment protection rules which is driven by election cycles, political parties,
and long run labor market characteristics that are plausibly exogenous to FDI. The results
that follow indicate that both instruments are strong predictors of employment protection
legislation. Furthermore, the exclusion restriction is satis￿ed which indicates that the in-
struments only a⁄ect FDI through their impact on employment protection legislation. The
construction of both instrumental variables will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.4.
A third empirical strategy is to estimate a dynamic panel model, where current FDI also
depends on the lagged value of FDI. This accounts for the possibility that FDI is persistent
over time. Thus, adding lagged FDI to equation (1) and ￿rst di⁄erencing leads to the
following estimation equation:
(2) ￿FDIc;t = ￿1￿EPc;t￿1 + ￿Xc;t￿1￿2 + ￿3￿FDIc;t￿1 + ￿￿t + ￿￿c;t
where the country ￿xed e⁄ects are subsumed by the annual di⁄erences. The issue with
estimating this equation is that the di⁄erenced residual, ￿￿c;t, is by construction corre-
lated with the lagged dependent variables, ￿FDIc;t￿1, since both are functions of "c;t￿1.
Similarly, ￿EPc;t￿1 and the control variables ￿Xc;t￿1 may also be correlated with ￿￿c;t.
Therefore, OLS regressions of equation (2) can produce inconsistent estimates. To avoid
this problem and to address potential endogeneity concerns, equation (2) will be estimated
9The race to the bottom hypothesis assumes that country￿ s employment protection legislation reponds
to other countries standards not one￿ s own level of FDI. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear how FDI would
a⁄ect employment protection legislation. Perhaps an increase in FDI encourages host countries to increase
employment restrictions to protect local workers from being exploited by foreign multinationals or maybe
increases in FDI encourage host countries to decrease employment restrictions to attract more FDI.
10Besley and Burgess (2004) also use unionization rates as an IV for labor regulations.
10using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator (Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 1988, Arellano
and Bond 1991). The most general Arellano-Bond GMM speci￿cation possible is utilized,
which instruments all right hand side variables with all their respective lagged levels.11 This
allows a causal impact of employment protection legislation on foreign direct investment to
be identi￿ed.
Given the theoretical motivation discussed in section 2, we would expect ￿1 < 0 and
￿1 < 0. As employment protection decreases, the costs of operating a foreign a¢ liate
decrease, and thus FDI increases as the multinational shifts production activities to that
foreign host country. In addition, the magnitude of ￿1 and ￿1 will depend crucially on
the type of FDI. Thus, each empirical speci￿cation will be separately estimated using total
FDI, horizontal FDI, export-platform FDI, and vertical FDI as the dependent variable. The
coe¢ cients on employment protection should be more negative as the degree of mobility
exhibited by each type of FDI increases. Speci￿cally, ￿1 and ￿1 will be most negative in
the vertical FDI regression, it will be least negative in the horizontal FDI regression, and
it will fall between these extremes in the export-platform FDI regression.
3.2 Testing Proposition 2
To test the second proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis, this paper examines
whether employment protection legislation depends on employment protection in other
foreign countries. Speci￿cally, the following equation is estimated using OLS:
(3) EPc;t = ￿1Competitor_EPc;t￿1 + Xc;t￿1￿2 + ￿c + ￿d + ￿c;t
where the dependent variable, EPc;t, is employment protection in foreign country c.
Competitor_EPc;t￿1 is the weighted average of employment protection in other foreign
countries not including country c. This variable is constructed using three di⁄erent weight-
ing techniques which will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.5. Xc;t￿1 is the vector
11The results that follow are robust to a wide variety of alternate GMM speci￿cations, including instru-
menting for fewer right hand side variables, including fewer lagged levels as instruments, and using system
GMM instead of di⁄erence GMM.
11of host country characteristics discussed earlier. ￿c are country ￿xed e⁄ects and ￿d are
decade ￿xed e⁄ects. Including year ￿xed e⁄ects is not possible in this analysis because they
would subsume the Competitor_EPc;t￿1 variable.12 Thus, decade ￿xed e⁄ects are included
instead, which will capture any long run trends in employment protection. Finally, all vari-
ables are in natural logarithms and the independent variables are lagged to account for the
fact that changes in employment protection legislation take time to implement.13
Despite the controls, lags, and ￿xed e⁄ects in equation 3, endogeneity may still be
a concern. For instance, as discussed in greater detail in section 6.2, perhaps there is
a general shift towards greater labor market ￿ exibility that has nothing to do with the
competitive undercutting of labor standards. To account for these endogeneity concerns,
an IV analysis identi￿es variation in competitor employment protection that is driven by
factors in individual foreign countries and that is unrelated with more general trends in labor
market regulations. Speci￿cally, employment protection is ￿rst regressed on the ideology
and union variables. The ￿tted values from this regression are kept and represent the change
in employment protection that is due these exogenous country speci￿c factors. Then the
weighted averages of these ￿tted values are calculated and used as an instrument for the
analogously weighted Competitor_EP.
Finally, proposition two will also be tested using a dynamic panel estimation strategy,
which accounts for the possibility that employment protection is persistent over time. Thus,
the following equation is estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator:
(4) ￿EPc;t = ￿1￿Competitor_EPc;t￿1 + ￿Xc;t￿1￿2 + ￿3￿EPc;t￿1 + ￿￿d + ￿c;t.
where ￿EPc;t￿1 is the change in lagged employment protection in country c. Here the
inclusion of year ￿xed e⁄ects would be even more problematic, since it would lead to perfect
multicollinearity. Thus, decade ￿xed e⁄ects are included instead. Again, the Arellano-Bond
12Speci￿cally, if year ￿xed e⁄ects were included, then the only variation left in Competitor_EPc;t￿1 would
come from the exclusion of the host country employment protection (EPc;t￿1) from the weighted average.
Since EP is correlated over time, then EPc;t and Competitor_EPc;t￿1 would be negatively correlated by
construction.
13Again, the results that follow are robust to using longer lags.
12GMM estimation strategy overcomes potentially inconsistent estimates and instruments
the right hand side variables with all their lagged levels. This identi￿es a causal impact
of competitor￿ s employment protection rules on the host country￿ s employment protection
rules.
Given the discussion in section 2, the race to the bottom hypothesis predicts that ￿1 > 0
and ￿1 > 0. As other foreign countries lower their employment protection rules, country c
will respond by reducing its own employment protections it order to undercut it￿ s competi-
tors. Ideally, the results will be consistent across all three weighting schemes and across all
three empirical speci￿cations.
4 Data
4.1 Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment is measured as U.S. direct investment abroad using data from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Focusing on multinationals from one country is
appealing because it minimizes parent country characteristics that may in￿ uence outward
FDI. In addition, data on U.S. multinational companies is more comprehensive and detailed
than FDI data from other countries. There is little reason to believe that the determinants
of U.S. FDI are fundamentally di⁄erent from the decisions facing multinationals in other
countries.
Another especially appealing aspect of the BEA data is that the a¢ liate sales measure
of FDI used in this analysis allows for horizontal, export-platform, and vertical FDI to be
separately examined. Speci￿cally, the BEA identi￿es the ultimate destination of the sales
by U.S. foreign a¢ liates. A¢ liate sales to the local market measures horizontal FDI, a¢ liate
sales to other foreign countries measures export-platform FDI, and a¢ liate sales back to the
U.S. measures vertical FDI.14 As mentioned before, the impact of employment protection
on FDI should become more negative as the type of FDI becomes relatively more mobile.
Finally, these a¢ liate sales variables are converted into real dollars using the chain-type
14There are many other types of ￿ complex￿FDI that are variations of these three basic components (Yeaple
2003). While these three categories may include more complex types of FDI, this will not fundamentally
change the basic ordering of these types of FDI from less-mobile to more-mobile.
13price index for gross domestic investment.15
4.2 Employment Protection
Data on employment protection comes from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). The OECD constructs a composite index of employment pro-
tection from seventeen individual measures of hiring and ￿ring costs. These seventeen basic
measures can be grouped into two broad categories, restrictions against ￿ring workers and
restrictions on hiring temporary workers. The ￿ring restrictions include measures such as
the noti￿cation process and timing of dismissals, the severance pay required, and the pro-
cedures for contesting an unfair dismissal. The hiring restrictions include measures such
as the allowable number and duration of ￿xed term contracts, the type of work that tem-
porary workers can do, and whether regular and temporary workers are treated equally.16
The composite employment protection index is measured on a scale of zero to six with six
representing the most restrictive rules.
This measure of employment protection has some important limitation that are worth
noting. First, employment protection legislation is one component of what we think of more
broadly as labor market standards. However, given the inclusion of country ￿xed e⁄ects,
the estimation strategy identi￿es changes in employment protection rules within a country.
As long as these changes in employment protection legislation are positively correlated with
other types of changes in employment rules, which seems plausible, this will be a useful proxy
for labor market standards more generally. Second, this employment protection measure is
only available for OECD countries. While these countries account for over three quarters
of US outward FDI, other less developed countries, where labor market standards may be
important, are not included. However, using a sample of relatively similar, rich countries
should, if anything, attenuate the results. The fact that this paper ￿nds signi￿cant and
plausible results among these OECD countries suggests that the relationships identi￿ed in
the paper are important and perhaps would be larger with a more diverse set of countries
15This price de￿ ator is found in the Economic Report of the President
(http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables10.html).
16For further details on the components of these measures and how they are calculated, see the methodology
section of the OECD Indicators of Employment Protection website at www.oecd.org/employment/protection.
14in the sample.
Despite these two issues, there are many aspects of this data that are especially appealing
and that more than compensate for these drawbacks. First and foremost, this is an objective
and consistent estimate of employment protection regulations in a wide variety of countries.
Changes in this measure of employment protection represent legislative and policy changes
in the host country that are more likely exogenous to foreign a¢ liate sales.17 Second, it is
possible to separate this index into its hiring and ￿ring sub-categories which proves useful
in the analysis that follows. Finally, this employment protection measure is available for
thirty countries and twenty four years (1985-2008). The scale and scope of this variable
represents an important improvement over other measures.18
4.3 Control Variables
The estimation strategy implemented in this analysis controls for both country and time
￿xed e⁄ects. To account for factors that may vary within a country over time, a variety
of additional control variables are included that are likely to in￿ uence the decision of a
multinational to pursue FDI. Perhaps most important is the host country￿ s real GDP which
is obtained from the OECD. The population of the host country also comes from the OECD.
Following Blonigen et al. (2007), I measure host country trade costs as the inverse of the
openness measure reported by the Penn World Tables (PWT).
Data on the host country skill level is obtained from the Barro and Lee (2010) Edu-
cational Attainment Dataset. They report the average year of schooling for those over 25
years old every ￿ve years from 1950-2010. The intervening years are calculated using linear
interpolation. Host country corporate income tax rates come from the OECD. Investment
costs in the host country are measured using data from the Business Environment Risk
Intelligence (BERI). Investment costs are calculated as the inverse of the composite in-
dex which includes the operations risk index, the political risk index, and the remittance
17Although changes in employment protection legislation is infrequent in some countries, when these
changes occur, they represent an important shift in labor market restrictions.
18Other authors (Gorg 2005, Dewit et al. 2009, Di Tella and MacCulloch 2005) have used data from the
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) produced by the World Economic Forum. This measure of hiring
and ￿ring costs is obtained from surveying local business managers about the hiring and ￿ring practices in
their country. This is relatively subjective and noisy measure which may not necessarily re￿ ect changes in
labor market legislation in the foreign host country.
15and repatriation factor index. This will account for institutional changes that could in￿ u-
ence FDI. Wages are measured using the unit labor cost index from the OECD. Wages
are included to account for any potential compensating wage di⁄erentials in response to
employment protection rules. Together, these control variables represent the factors that
have been identi￿ed as important determinants of FDI. The inclusion of these important
controls in the analysis that follows limits concerns that changes in employment protection
rules are inadvertently capturing other institutional and economic changes that could be
correlated with FDI.
4.4 Instruments
The IV analysis uses the political ideology and strength of the ruling party and unionization
density as instruments for employment protection. Data used to construct the political ide-
ology variable comes from the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset (Henisz 2002).
First, I identi￿ed the ideology of the political party that controls the executive branch of
the government. Each ruling political party is identi￿ed as liberal, neutral, or conserv-
ative.19 Then this ideology variable is interacted with a measure of political constraint
which re￿ ects the relative strength of the ruling party. Speci￿cally, the political constraint
variable takes into account the number of branches within the government that have veto
power over policy changes, the party alignment across the branches of government, and the
party heterogeneity within the legislative branches of government. This modi￿ed political
ideology variable takes on values between one and three. Values close to three indicate that
a relatively powerful liberal party is in control, values close to two indicate a relatively weak
or neutral party is in control, and values close to one indicate that a relatively powerful
conservative party is in control. A ruling party that is more liberal and powerful is more
likely to implement employment protection legislation.
Following Besley and Burgess (2004), I also instrument employment protection with the
unionization rate. Data on the unionization rate in the foreign country comes from the
OECD and is calculated as the share of total wage and salary earners that are trade union
19My de￿nition of party ideology is virtually identical to those produced by the World Bank in their 2010
Database of Political Institutions. The results are robust to the use of either de￿nition.
16members. As discussed previously, a lower unionization density may increase the need for
labor market regulations.
4.5 Competitor Employment Protection
The employment protection measure from the OECD is used to construct the average of em-
ployment protection in other foreign countries. Speci￿cally, for country c the Competitor_EP
variable is calculated as the weighted average of employment protection in all other foreign
countries in the sample, not including country c itself. There are three di⁄erent methods
used to construct this average.
First, this variable is constructed as the unweighted average of employment protection
in the other foreign countries. This method weights equally all other foreign countries.
Second, Competitor_EP is constructed using the inverse of distance between country c and
the other foreign host countries as weights. Thus, the employment protection legislation in
countries that are closer in proximity to country c are weighted more heavily. The weights
are normalized to one to account for the fact that the sample of countries changes over this
period.20
The third method weights more heavily those countries that are likely competing with
country c for FDI. Speci￿cally, the average vertical and export-platform FDI sales in each
foreign country is used as a weight. The weights are normalized so that employment pro-
tection in those countries that have a greater share of vertical and export platform FDI
sales are weighted more heavily. Since these types of FDI are more mobile, then country c
will be more responsive to changes in employment protection rules in countries that have
a larger share of this type of FDI. In other words, these foreign countries will be the ones
that country c is competing against to attract these relatively mobile types of FDI.
Finally, the weighted average of the ￿tted values, obtained from ￿rst regressing em-
ployment protection on ideology and union, are also calculated using these three di⁄erent
methods. The weighted average of the ￿tted values is the instrument used for the analo-
gously weighted Competitor_EP.
20The results that follow are similar if the sample is restricted to countries that have data for the entire
period.
174.6 Descriptive Statistics
Combining these various measures, generates an unbalanced panel data set that spans
twenty six countries and twenty three years (1985-2007).21 The twenty six countries in this
sample accounted for 78% of U.S. FDI in 2000. Table 1 reports the summary statistics
of the variables used in this analysis. While the sample includes only OECD countries,
Table 1 indicates there is substantial variation in all of these measures. For instance, real
a¢ liate sales varied from $1,165 million in Turkey in 1985 to $586,295 million in the United
Kingdom in 2007. On a scale of zero to six with six being the most restrictive, employment
protection ranges from 0.6 in the United Kingdom in the 1990s to 4.2 in Portugal in the
late 1980s.
Figure 2 plots the annual average of employment protection against the annual average
of real a¢ liate sales. A signi￿cant negative relationship between employment protection
and a¢ liate sales is evident in Figure 2. This is consistent with Figure 1, and indicates that
over time there has been a downward trend in employment protection rules and an upward
trend in U.S. foreign a¢ liate sales.
Figure 3 plots the country average of employment protection against the country average
of real a¢ liate sales. The U.K. and Canada have relatively lax employment protection rules
and have high foreign a¢ liate sales. However, countries such as Portugal, Turkey and
Greece have had strict employment protection rules and low levels of U.S. foreign a¢ liate
sales. On the other hand, France and Germany have strict employment protection rules
but high levels of a¢ liate sales. Again, there is a strong negative relationship between
employment protection and a¢ liate sales. Countries that have strict employment protection
rules typically have less U.S. foreign a¢ liate sales.
Figure 4 plots the country average of employment protection against the country av-
erage of di⁄erent types of real a¢ liate sales. Two observations are worth noting. First,
there is interesting variation across countries in terms of which type of FDI is most impor-
tant. Not surprisingly, Japan and Australia have relatively large shares of horizontal U.S.
21The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
18FDI, Ireland and Switzerland have relatively large shares of export-platform U.S. FDI, and
Mexico has a relatively large share of vertical U.S. FDI. Second, a negative relationship
between employment protection and all three types of FDI is evident in Figure 4. However,
the relationship between employment protection and vertical FDI is the most negative and
signi￿cant, which is consistent with the intuition from section 2.
Figures 2-4 provide insight into the dimensions and characteristics of the data set used
in this analysis. It is interesting that such a strong negative relationship emerges in these
basic scatter-plots. However, there are some important limitations of these scatter-plots
which the empirical analysis that follows is able to overcome. First, the country and year
￿xed e⁄ects will capture much of the variation evident in these ￿gures. The analysis that
follows exploits country variation over time to examine the impact of employment protection
on foreign a¢ liate sales. Second, these ￿gures do not account for other factors that are
changing over time and may be a⁄ecting both a¢ liate sales and employment protection.
As discussed previously, a wide array of control variables will be included in the empirical
analysis. Third, this negative correlation does not imply causation. Fortunately, the GMM
and IV estimation strategies will identify a causal impact of employment protection on
foreign a¢ liate sales. With these caveats in mind, it is surprising that such a consistently
negative relationship emerges in Figures 2-4. The section that follows examines whether
this relationship is robust to a more careful and rigorous analysis.
Finally, Figure 5 plots country speci￿c employment protection rules over time. With the
inclusion of country and year ￿xed e⁄ects in the analysis that follows, this is the variation
that will be exploited. The top panel shows all twenty six countries over time, while the
middle and bottom panel show the countries that implemented the largest decreases and
largest increases in employment protection over the sample period. There has been a down-
ward trend in employment protection rules, which is consistent with the race to the bottom
hypothesis. However, Figure 5 illustrates substantial variation across countries and over
time. For instance, Germany and Spain relaxed their employment protection rules while
France and New Zealand implemented stricter rules during this period. In the bottom panel
of Figure 5, we also see the large di⁄erence in employment protection rules between France
and the UK, which Hoover indicated was one of the factors that led them to relocate their
19production activities.
Figure 5 also shows that while changes in employment protection rules can be infre-
quent in some countries, many implement substantial changes which occur at di⁄erent
years within the sample. For instance, Spain, in 1994, relaxed their procedural require-
ments for dismissals and permitted temporary work agencies. Then in 1997, they reduced
the compensation for an unfair dismissals and also rede￿ned the de￿nition of a fair dis-
missal. However, in 2001 Spain tightened the rules governing when ￿xed term contracts
can be used. In contrast, France saw an increase in employment protection rules over the
sample despite the fact that they eliminated the administrative authorization necessary for
dismissals in 1986. They limited the permissible use and duration of ￿xed term contracts
and temporary work agencies in 1990 and then increased severance pay entitlements in
2001.22 The analysis that follows examines the impact of these and other changes in em-
ployment protection rules on FDI, and identi￿es to what extent these changes are driven
by countries competitively undercutting each others labor standards.
5 Results
The goal of this paper is to examine whether FDI responds to employment protection
legislation and whether countries competitively undercut each other￿ s labor standards. This
section tests these two predictions of the race to the bottom hypothesis using a variety of
di⁄erent estimation strategies. First, the impact of employment protection restrictions on
foreign a¢ liate sales to di⁄erent locations is examined. Second, I examine whether countries
competitively reduce their employment restrictions in response to changes in employment
restrictions in other foreign countries.
5.1 Proposition 1 Results
The OLS results obtained from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 2. The results
in column 1 indicate that a reduction in employment protection rules leads to a signi￿cant
increase in foreign a¢ liate sales. Given the log-log speci￿cation, a 1 percent decrease in
22See Table 2.A2.6 in Chapter 2 of the OECD Employment Outlook (2004) for additional details.
20employment protection leads to a 0.2 percent increase in foreign a¢ liate sales. This is
consistent with the ￿rst proposition which states that laxer employment protection rules
decrease the costs of operating in the host country and thus increases U.S. FDI to that
foreign country.
Columns 2-4 of Table 2 separate foreign a¢ liate sales by the ultimate destination of
these sales. The results in column 2 indicate that employment protection reduces foreign
a¢ liate sales to the local host country (horizontal FDI). The results in column 3 indicate
that employment protection does not have a signi￿cant impact on foreign a¢ liate sales to
other foreign countries (export-platform FDI). Finally, the results in column 4 indicate that
employment protection has a large, negative impact on foreign a¢ liate sales back to the
U.S. (vertical FDI). These ￿ndings provide preliminary support for the intuition discussed in
section 2. Speci￿cally, employment protection legislation has the strongest negative impact
on the most mobile type of FDI. However, we would expect that the coe¢ cient on export-
platform FDI to be bounded by the coe¢ cients on horizontal and vertical FDI, which is not
the case in Table 2 but does occur in the IV and GMM results.
The coe¢ cients on the control variables are signi￿cant and of the expected sign. Foreign
direct investment increases with the size of the foreign economy, with reductions in trade
costs, with reductions in the average skill level, and with reductions in investment costs.
Consistent with other studies, GDP has a stronger positive impact on horizontal FDI while
trade costs, skill, and investment costs have a stronger negative impact on vertical FDI.
Also consistent with the theoretical predictions, horizontal FDI increases with wages but
vertical FDI decreases with wages. The negative coe¢ cient on the tax rate variable indicates
that as corporate tax rates decline FDI increases. The results indicate that this negative
relationship is larger for vertical FDI which is consistent with a race to the bottom in
corporate tax rates. However, this ￿nding is only signi￿cant at the ten percent level and is
not robust to the other empirical speci￿cations.
Next, equation (1) is estimated using the IV estimation strategy. Table 3 reports the
￿rst stage IV results for all four sales regressions.23 As expected, the political ideology
23Although similar, the ￿rst stage results are not exactly the same for the di⁄erent IV regressions because
the sample size changes depending on which foreign a¢ liate sales dependent variable is used in the second
stage.
21variable has a positive impact on employment protection. A strong liberal government
is more likely to implement labor market restrictions. Also consistent with expectations,
the unionization rate has a negative a⁄ect on employment protection. As the prevalence
of unions decreases, there is more need to protect workers through government imposed
labor market restrictions. The F-stat on the excluded instruments is above 40 in all the
regressions, which indicates relatively strong instruments.
The second stage IV results are reported in Table 4. Employment protection has a
negative impact on total foreign a¢ liate sales, which is signi￿cant at the one percent level.
In addition, the impact of employment protection on di⁄erent types of a¢ liate sales is
consistent with the predictions from section 2. In column 2, employment protection has a
relatively small negative impact on sales to the local market (horizontal FDI). This is consis-
tent with the prediction that horizontal FDI is not as sensitive to host country employment
protection rules. U.S. multinationals want to access foreign markets and are thus relatively
unresponsive to changes in employment restrictions in the host country. In column 3, em-
ployment protection has a negative and signi￿cant e⁄ect on a¢ liate sales to other foreign
countries (export-platform FDI). With export-platform FDI, U.S. multinationals can access
a foreign market through a variety of di⁄erent neighboring countries. Thus, as the employ-
ment protections become less strict, U.S. multinationals shift their a¢ liate production from
other foreign countries in the region to that particular foreign host country.
In column 4, employment protection has a large, negative, and signi￿cant impact on
a¢ liate sales back to the U.S. (vertical FDI). Speci￿cally, a 1 percent decrease in employ-
ment protection leads to a 2.7 percent increase in foreign a¢ liate sales to the U.S. With
vertical FDI, U.S. multinationals are not constrained geographically by the need to access
a foreign market. Thus, if the costs of operating foreign a¢ liates decrease, due to less
strict employment protection rules, the U.S. multinational relocates a¢ liate production to
that relatively less expensive foreign host country. The results in Table 4 provide clear and
convincing evidence that less restrictive employment protection legislation increases FDI.
Importantly, in all IV speci￿cations, the exclusion restriction is satis￿ed. Speci￿cally, the
high Hansen J p-values in Table 4 demonstrate a failure to reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage. This overidenti￿cation
22test indicates that the instruments are valid and only a⁄ect a¢ liate sales through their
impact on employment protection. There is no evidence that the instruments a⁄ect a¢ liate
sales directly or through a channel other than the employment protection link.
For those unconvinced by the OLS or IV results, the Arellano-Bond GMM results ob-
tained from estimating the dynamic panel model speci￿ed in equation (2) are reported in
Table 5. The implied long-run elasticity on employment protection is reported under the
estimated coe¢ cients (Arellano and Bond 1991). Once again, employment protection has a
negative impact on total foreign a¢ liate sales, but this relationship is only signi￿cant at the
ten percent level (see column 1). More importantly, the impact of labor market restrictions
on di⁄erent types of FDI is consistent with expectations. Employment protection has an
insigni￿cant impact on horizontal FDI (column 2), a small negative impact on export plat-
form FDI (column 3), and a large negative impact on vertical FDI (column 4). Speci￿cally,
a 1 percent decrease in employment protection leads to a 1.3% increase in foreign a¢ liate
sales to the U.S. The lagged sales coe¢ cients in all of the regression in Table 5 are posi-
tive and signi￿cant which indicates that a¢ liate sales are persistent over time. The high
p-values on the Hansen J and second order autocorrelation (AR2) tests indicate that the
lags of the independent variables are in fact exogenous and are thus good instruments.24
Overall, the results in Tables 2-5 support the ￿rst proposition of the race to the bottom
hypothesis. As employment protection legislation decreases, foreign direct investment in-
creases. In addition, with more mobile types of FDI, the relationship between employment
protection and foreign a¢ liate sales becomes larger in magnitude and more signi￿cant. This
is an important result and indicates that the response of multinational ￿rms to employment
protection depends crucially on the type of FDI. Furthermore, despite very di⁄erent estima-
tion and identi￿cation strategies, these key results are remarkably robust across the OLS,
IV, and GMM speci￿cations.
24However, the Hansen J test can be weakened when, as a rule of thumb, the number of instruments
exceeds the number of groups (i.e. countries). This is the case in this analysis because there are a relatively
large number of years which increases the instrument matrix. However, this does not a⁄ect the coe¢ cient
estimates (Roodman 2006) and the results in Table 5 are not sensitive to reducing the number of lagged
instruments used in the GMM estimation strategy.
235.2 Proposition 2 Results
The results so far indicate that FDI, particularly export-platform and vertical FDI, increases
as employment restrictions are relaxed. This provides a motivation for foreign host countries
to competitively undercut each other￿ s labor standards. To test this second key proposition
of the race to the bottom hypothesis, I estimate the impact of employment protection rules
in competing foreign countries on the host country￿ s own employment protection rules.
Table 6 reports the OLS results from estimating equation 3. The dependent variable is
host country employment protection and the key independent variable is Competitor_EP
which is the average of employment protection in other foreign countries. As discussed pre-
viously, Competitor_EP is constructed as an unweighted average in column 1, a weighted
average based on the inverse of distance in column 2, and a weighted average using a¢ liate
sales in column 3. In all speci￿cations, the coe¢ cient on Competitor_EP is positive and
signi￿cant at the one percent level. Speci￿cally, in columns 2 and 3 a one percent reduc-
tion in the weighted average of other country￿ s employment protection rules leads the host
country to lower its own employment protection rules by 1% too. This supports proposi-
tion two of the race to the bottom hypothesis and indicates that a foreign country lowers
their employment protection rules in response to other foreign countries lowering their la-
bor standards. In other words, the results in Table 6 show that countries are competitively
undercutting each other￿ s labor standards.
Equation 3 is also estimated using an IV speci￿cation. Table 7 reports the results from
this ￿rst stage IV regression. As discussed previously, Competitor_EP_IV is constructed
by ￿rst regressing employment protection on ideology and union. The ￿tted values from
this regression are then averaged using the same three weighting methods used to construct
Competitor_EP. This instrument identi￿es variation in competitor￿ s employment protec-
tion rules that is driven by country speci￿c changes in ideology and unions. The results in
Table 7 show that the instrument has a positive and signi￿cant impact on the analogously
weighted Competitor_EP. The ￿rst stage F-stat on the instrument is above 20 in all of
these speci￿cations, which indicates a relatively strong instrument.
The second stage IV results are reported in Table 8. The results indicate that competi-
24tors￿employment protection rules has a positive and signi￿cant impact on the host country￿ s
employment protection rules. This ￿nding is robust to all three weighting measures. In-
terestingly, the coe¢ cient on Competitor_EP is largest in the sales weighted regression
which indicates employment protection rules are relatively more responsive to competitor￿ s
with more FDI. In addition, the coe¢ cients on the control variables are signi￿cant and of
the expected sign. Employment protection is increasing with GDP, population, tax rate,
and ideology and is decreasing with trade costs, skill, investment costs, wages, and unions.
Overall, these IV results provide strong support for the second proposition that countries
are competitively undercutting each other￿ s labor standards.
Finally, Table 9 reports the Arellano-Bond GMM results from estimating the dynamic
panel model speci￿ed in equation 4. The implied long-run elasticity on the independent
variable of interest, Competitor_EP, is reported under the estimated coe¢ cients. Once
again, Competitor_EP has a positive and signi￿cant impact on the host country￿ s em-
ployment protection rules. A 1 percent increase in Competitor_EP, leads to between a
1.5 and a 3.1 percent increase in host country employment protection depending on which
weighting method is used. In addition, the coe¢ cients on lagged host country employment
protection is positive and signi￿cant which indicates, as expected, that these labor market
regulations are persistent over time. The high p-values on the Hansen J and second order
autocorrelation (AR2) tests indicate that the lags of the dependent variables are in fact
exogenous and are thus good instruments.
Overall, the results in Tables 6-9 provide strong support for the second proposition of
the race to the bottom hypothesis. The positive coe¢ cients on Competitor_EP indicate
that countries are competitively undercutting each other￿ s labor standards. This key ￿nding
is robust to three di⁄erent weighting schemes and to three di⁄erent estimation strategies.
6 Extensions
The following extensions and robustness checks provide additional insight into the key
relationships identi￿ed in this paper. Speci￿cally, di⁄erent components of employment
protection rules are examined, the sample is restricted to European countries, and alternate
25explanations for the observed relationships are discussed.
6.1 Employment Protection Components
The employment protection measure from the OECD is an average of ￿ring and hiring costs.
This section examines whether the predictions from the race to the bottom hypothesis holds
for each of these components of employment protection. By de￿nition these ￿ring and hiring
components have less variation than the composite index. However, by separating the two,
it is possible to examine whether foreign a¢ liate sales respond di⁄erently to ￿ring and
hiring restrictions and whether the competitive undercutting of labor standards is more
pronounced with one component relative to the other.
Table 10 reports the IV estimation results from regressing total a¢ liate sales on the ￿ring
and hiring components of employment protection. Column 1 replicates the earlier baseline
results from Table 4, while columns 2 and 3 separately estimate the impact of ￿ring and
hiring restrictions on total a¢ liate sales. The results indicate that a one percent decrease in
￿ring restrictions increases a¢ liate sales by 1.0% and a one percent decrease in restrictions
on hiring temporary workers increases a¢ liate sales by 0.5%. Thus, multinationals respond
to both types of labor market restrictions. However, the di⁄erence in the magnitude of the
coe¢ cients suggests that ￿ring restrictions are a greater deterrent to FDI than restrictions
on hiring temporary workers.
Table 11 reports the IV results from testing the second proposition of the race to the bot-
tom hypothesis using the ￿ring and hiring components. Column 1 reports the baseline dis-
tance weighted result from Table 8. Separate Competitor_EP variables and their analogous
instruments are constructed using the ￿ring and hiring components. The ￿ring and hiring
results are reported in columns 2 and 3 respectively. In column 2, Competitor_EP_Firing
has an insigni￿cant impact on the host country￿ s ￿ring rules. This is because the ￿rst stage
regression is weak with an F-stat of 0.04. However, in column 3, Competitor_EP_Hiring
has a signi￿cant positive impact on the host country￿ s hiring rules and a ￿rst stage F-stat
of 52. The di⁄erence between these results may indicate that the competitive undercutting
is more of an issue with rules regarding hiring temporary workers. This is consistent with
the fact that changes in restrictions on hiring temporary workers have been relatively more
26common, especially in Europe. Or perhaps the di⁄erence in results is simply driven by the
more technical issue regarding the power of the IV in the ￿rst stage.
6.2 European Sample
Given the concerns about pooling diverse countries into one sample (Blonigen et al. 2007),
the sample is limited to just European countries in this robustness check. This addresses
concerns that the response of FDI to employment protection or the spatial dependence of
employment protection is sensitive to the sample used. For instance, maybe the results
are driven by some unobserved factors associated with the fact that some countries in the
sample join the EU while others do not. To address this concern, the sample is restricted
to European countries only and the results are compared to the baseline ￿ndings.25
First, the implications of employment protection on FDI is examined. Speci￿cally, Table
12 reports the IV results including just European countries. Like the baseline results in
Table 4, employment protection has a negative and signi￿cant impact on total foreign
a¢ liate sales. Furthermore, employment protection has an increasingly negative impact
on horizontal, export-platform, and vertical FDI. Once again, the ￿rst stage F-stats and
the overidenti￿cation tests indicate that the instruments are strong and exogenous. Thus,
despite the reduced number of observations, the results including just European countries
are consistent with the baseline results.
Next, the test of the second proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis is estimated
using just the European sample. Table 13 reports these IV results which are consistent
with the baseline results from Table 8. The coe¢ cient on Competitor_EP is positive and
signi￿cant at the one percent level in all of the regressions. As competitor￿ s labor standards
are lowered, the foreign host country decreases their own employment protection rules in
response. Overall, the results in Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the key ￿ndings of the paper
are robust to restricting the sample to just European countries.
25There is not enough data to separately estimate the results using just the non-European countries.
276.3 Labor Market Flexibility
Could the results supporting the second proposition of the race to the bottom simply be
an artifact of a more general shift towards greater labor market ￿ exibility? While it is
di¢ cult to conclusively separate a general movement towards labor market ￿ exibility from
competitive undercutting, there are a number of components of this analysis that support
this latter hypothesis.
First, there are a number of large important countries whose employment protection
rules increased over the sample, including UK, France, Australia, Poland, Ireland, Hungary,
and New Zealand (see Figure 4). While on average there has been a reduction in employ-
ment protection rules, there are many exceptions to this trend which are not consistent with
a universal move towards greater labor market ￿ exibility. Second, the timing of the changes
in employment protection rules supports the race to the bottom hypothesis. As we see in
Figure 5, the changes in country￿ s rules are spread throughout the sample. A general move-
ment towards greater labor market ￿ exibility would generate a more coordinated reduction
during a more concentrated time period. In addition, the empirical speci￿cation lags the
independent variables which is consistent with country￿ s responding to their competitors
rather than a contemporaneous change in attitudes towards labor market restrictions.
Third, the empirical analysis includes decade ￿xed e⁄ects, which will control for trends
in the data, including potential attitudes toward labor market restrictions. Fourth, the IV
analysis speci￿cally identi￿es variation in the surrounding employment protection variable
that is driven by country speci￿c changes in ideology and unions. Thus, a more general
shift in labor market ￿ exibility is eliminated from this empirical speci￿cation. Fifth, a
general movement towards labor market ￿ exibility may in fact be motivated by a desire to
attract FDI as a way of stimulating growth and reducing domestic unemployment. Thus,
these two hypothesis are not incompatible and if anything attracting foreign investment
could be an underlying cause for a more general movement towards greater labor market
￿ exibility, especially in light of the strong results supporting the ￿rst proposition of the race
to the bottom hypothesis. Finally, the empirical results of this paper are consistent with
anecdotal evidence in Europe, such as the Hoover case, that "social dumping" is occurring,
28where countries lower social standards in an attempt to attract ￿rms away from other
countries. Thus, overall the results in this paper provide fairly compelling evidence that
countries are undercutting each other￿ s labor standards and these results are not simply
due to a general shift towards more ￿ exible labor markets.
7 Conclusion
There are two implicit assumptions in the race to the bottom hypothesis. The ￿rst is
that multinationals will increase their foreign direct investment in response to reductions
in employment protection in a foreign country. Furthermore, the relatively mobile types
of FDI will be most responsive to employment protection rules. The second assumption is
that countries competitively undercut each other￿ s labor standards in order to attract FDI.
The empirical results presented in this paper are consistent with both proposition of
the race to the bottom hypothesis. Speci￿cally, there is a signi￿cant negative impact of
employment protection on FDI. A reduction in employment protection rules leads to an
increase in foreign a¢ liate sales. In addition, this negative relationship is strongest among
the most mobile types of FDI. Employment protection legislation in the host country has
limited impact on horizontal FDI, a more substantial negative impact on export-platform
FDI, and a large, negative impact on vertical FDI. These results are consistent across the
OLS, IV, and GMM estimation strategies.
In addition, there is evidence that countries are competitively undercutting each other￿ s
labor standards to attract foreign investment. Speci￿cally, this paper examines whether
labor standards in other foreign countries a⁄ect the employment restrictions in the foreign
host country. Regardless of the weighting method or the estimation strategy, there is a
signi￿cant positive impact on the host country￿ s employment protection rules. Overall, this
paper ￿nds support for both proposition of the race to the bottom hypothesis. Multination-
als invest in countries with lower labor standards and countries respond by competitively
undercut one another￿ s labor standards in order to attract FDI. At the very least, the re-
sults in this paper indicate that a race to the bottom in labor standards cannot be easily
dismissed, as is often the case.
29Whether a race to the bottom is a desirable outcome depends on one￿ s view of employ-
ment protection. If labor market restrictions are necessary to protect the rights of workers,
then these results are discouraging. Multinationals are investing in countries with the least
restrictive regulatory standards and this is promoting a race to the bottom. However, if la-
bor market restrictions are undesirable and hinder economic ￿ exibility and growth, then the
￿nding that countries are competitively lowering employment restrictions is encouraging.
Attracting foreign investment provides an incentive for countries to liberalize their labor
markets. Regardless of ones perspective on labor market restrictions, this paper provides
important new evidence that FDI does respond to regulatory standards and that countries
are competitively lowering standards in response.
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34FIGURE 1
U.S. Foreign Direct Investment and Employment Protection in OECD
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Total Affiliate Sales ($m) 556 71,364 96,918 1,165 586,295
Employment Protection 560 2.2 1.0 0.6 4.2
GDP ($m) 582 627,057 709,352 43,425 3,618,565
Population (thousands) 598 31,543 31,937 3,272 127,787
Trade Costs 593 0.021 0.011 0.006 0.068
Skill 598 9.4 1.9 4.0 13.1
Tax Rate 549 33.4 9.7 8.5 56.0
Investment Costs 590 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.027
Wages (Index) 570 80.5 24.0 0.0 121.8
Union 558 35.2 20.0 6.6 83.9
Ideology 590 2.1 0.5 1.2 3.0
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
The sample includes 26 OECD countries and 23 years (1985-2007).
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36FIGURE 4
Horizontal FDI (Country Average)
Export-Platform FDI (Country Average)
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37FIGURE 5
Country Employment Protection Over Time
Countries with Largest Declines in Employment Protection
Countries with Largest Increases in Employment Protection
38Total Sales Local Sales Foreign Sales U.S. Sales
Employment Protection t-1 -0.175*** -0.177*** -0.096 -0.670***
[0.056] [0.050] [0.134] [0.222]
GDP t-1 1.625*** 1.950*** -0.046 0.768
[0.127] [0.134] [0.358] [0.724]
Population t-1 -0.676* -0.575 1.089 -0.335
[0.377] [0.368] [0.883] [1.393]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.779*** -0.397*** -2.337*** -2.614***
[0.118] [0.116] [0.288] [0.497]
Skill t-1 -0.914*** -0.587*** -2.047*** -2.749***
[0.132] [0.116] [0.368] [0.714]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.113* -0.088* -0.103 -0.467*
[0.061] [0.052] [0.138] [0.249]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.388** -0.330** -1.865*** -3.721***
[0.162] [0.163] [0.615] [1.140]
Wages t-1 0.116*** 0.195*** 0.021 -0.605***
[0.044] [0.042] [0.110] [0.207]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 485 467 477 459
R-squared 0.990 0.991 0.963 0.926
TABLE 2
Foreign Affiliate Sales by Destination (OLS)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is U.S. foreign affiliates sales.  'Total Sales' are affiliate sales to all locations, 'Local
Sales' are affiliate sales within the host country, 'Foreign Sales' are affiliate sales to other foreign countries
not including the U.S. or the host country, and 'U.S. Sales' are affiliate sales back to the U.S.
39Total Sales Local Sales Foreign Sales U.S. Sales
Ideology t-1 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.063***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022]
Union t-1 -0.422*** -0.414*** -0.422*** -0.415***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.045]
GDP t-1 0.453*** 0.436*** 0.467*** 0.450***
[0.065] [0.065] [0.067] [0.068]
Population t-1 2.090*** 2.042*** 2.065*** 2.014***
[0.232] [0.231] [0.233] [0.233]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.166*** -0.162*** -0.165*** -0.160**
[0.061] [0.062] [0.062] [0.064]
Skill t-1 -0.190** -0.201** -0.190** -0.201**
[0.085] [0.084] [0.085] [0.084]
Tax Rate t-1 0.284*** 0.271*** 0.293*** 0.280***
[0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.038]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.056 -0.101 -0.049 -0.095
[0.105] [0.108] [0.106] [0.109]
Wages t-1 -0.087*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.080***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.028]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 477 459 469 451
R-squared 0.971 0.973 0.971 0.972
F-Stat, Instruments 52 50 51 48
TABLE 3
First Stage IV Results (Dependent Variable: Employment Protection t-1)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is employment protection in all regressions.  These first stage results vary slightly
depending on the sample size of the affiliate sales measure used in the second stage.
40Total Sales Local Sales Foreign Sales U.S. Sales
Employment Protection t-1 -0.631*** -0.444*** -1.393*** -2.745***
[0.137] [0.133] [0.459] [1.059]
GDP t-1 1.921*** 2.125*** 0.779** 1.900***
[0.141] [0.153] [0.316] [0.486]
Population t-1 0.031 -0.187 2.868** 2.517
[0.443] [0.442] [1.299] [2.642]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.823*** -0.414*** -2.418*** -2.802***
[0.119] [0.117] [0.320] [0.596]
Skill t-1 -1.087*** -0.686*** -2.605*** -3.764***
[0.149] [0.119] [0.477] [1.022]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.015 -0.034 0.175 -0.065
[0.059] [0.053] [0.156] [0.263]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.343** -0.327** -1.539*** -2.994***
[0.163] [0.158] [0.560] [0.989]
Wages t-1 0.034 0.138** -0.069 -0.433*
[0.061] [0.064] [0.137] [0.259]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 477 459 469 451
R-squared 0.989 0.991 0.954 0.916
Hansen J p-value 0.26 0.16 0.86 0.15
TABLE 4
Impact of Employment Protection on Foreign Affiliate Sales by Destination (IV)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is U.S. foreign affiliates sales in period t.  'Total Sales' are affiliate sales to all locations,
'Local Sales' are affiliate sales within the host country, 'Foreign Sales' are affiliate sales to other foreign
countries not including the U.S. or the host country, and 'U.S. Sales' are affiliate sales back to the U.S.
41Total Sales Local Sales Foreign Sales U.S. Sales
Employment Protection t-1 -0.097* -0.070 -0.184** -0.570***
[0.051] [0.071] [0.083] [0.188]
GDP t-1 0.337** 0.558*** 0.372* 1.307**
[0.159] [0.170] [0.200] [0.539]
Population t-1 0.100 -0.189 0.479 -1.054
[0.318] [0.422] [0.503] [1.156]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.221* -0.350*** -0.550*** -0.655**
[0.126] [0.111] [0.187] [0.318]
Skill t-1 -0.376*** -0.469*** -0.551*** -0.860**
[0.098] [0.119] [0.197] [0.402]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.005 -0.066 0.028 -0.100
[0.053] [0.051] [0.081] [0.177]
Investment Costs t-1 0.137 0.087 0.133 -0.755
[0.134] [0.136] [0.208] [0.609]
Wages t-1 -0.014 0.047 0.135* -0.069
[0.039] [0.062] [0.070] [0.217]
Total sales t-1 0.809***
[0.035]
Local sales t-1 0.683***
[0.053]
Foreign sales t-1 0.664***
[0.042]
U.S. sales t-1 0.567***
[0.119]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 456 415 432 395
Hansen J p-value 1 1 1 1
AR2 p-value 0.549 0.086 0.188 0.991
Implied Long-Run Elasticity:
Employment Protection t-1 -0.511* -0.222 -0.547* -1.319**
[0.296] [0.226] [0.267] [0.617]
TABLE 5
Impact of Employment Protection on Foreign Affiliate Sales by Destination (Arellano - Bond GMM)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is U.S. foreign affiliates sales.  'Total Sales' are affiliate sales to all locations, 'Local
Sales' are affiliate sales within the host country, 'Foreign Sales' are affiliate sales to other foreign countries
not including the U.S. or the host country, and 'U.S. Sales' are affiliate sales back to the U.S.
42Unweighted Average Distance Weighted Sales Weighted
Competitor EP t-1 1.806*** 1.036*** 1.088***
[0.193] [0.122] [0.199]
GDP t-1 0.349*** 0.284*** 0.318***
[0.073] [0.072] [0.078]
Population t-1 1.689*** 1.373*** 1.239***
[0.242] [0.232] [0.235]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.088 -0.051 0.024
[0.066] [0.065] [0.068]
Skill t-1 -0.448*** -0.480*** -0.579***
[0.087] [0.085] [0.092]
Tax Rate t-1 0.284*** 0.249*** 0.277***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.045]
Investment Costs t-1 0.005 -0.015 0.004
[0.120] [0.122] [0.126]
Wages t-1 -0.083*** -0.077** -0.060*
[0.031] [0.031] [0.032]
Ideology t-1 0.049** 0.036* 0.024
[0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
Union t-1 -0.415*** -0.384*** -0.396***
[0.046] [0.045] [0.050]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 489 489
R-squared 0.962 0.961 0.959
TABLE 6
Impact of Competitor Employment Protection on Host Employment Protection (OLS)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is employment protection in the host country.   The competitor's employment protection
variable is the average of employment protection in other foreign countries, which is calculated as an
unweighted average, a weighted average using the inverse of distance, and a weighted average using
affiliate sales.
43Unweighted Average Distance Weighted Sales Weighted
Competitor EP IV t-1 0.836*** 0.908*** 1.034***
[0.117] [0.185] [0.177]
GDP t-1 -0.054*** -0.017 -0.045**
[0.020] [0.037] [0.019]
Population t-1 -0.423*** -0.443*** -0.266***
[0.054] [0.096] [0.052]
Trade Costs t-1 0.112*** 0.161*** 0.083***
[0.014] [0.023] [0.014]
Skill t-1 -0.073*** -0.089*** 0.018
[0.023] [0.031] [0.019]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.024*** -0.014 -0.038***
[0.008] [0.014] [0.008]
Investment Costs t-1 0.054* 0.127*** 0.099***
[0.029] [0.047] [0.032]
Wages t-1 0.018** 0.022* 0.010*
[0.007] [0.012] [0.006]
Ideology t-1 -0.019*** -0.024*** -0.009*
[0.004] [0.007] [0.005]
Union t-1 0.031*** 0.029* 0.033***
[0.009] [0.016] [0.009]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 489 489
R-squared 0.920 0.888 0.913
F-Stat, Instruments 51 24 34
TABLE 7
First Stage IV Results (Dependent Variable: Competitor EP t-1)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is the average of employment protection in other foreign countries.   The Competitor EP
instrument is constructed by first regressing employment protection on ideology and union and capturing
the fitted values.  Then these fitted values are averaged using the three different methods used to construct
Competitor EP.
44Unweighted Average Distance Weighted Sales Weighted
Competitor EP t-1 1.769** 2.119*** 3.215***
[0.763] [0.600] [0.768]
GDP t-1 0.348*** 0.284*** 0.386***
[0.077] [0.076] [0.085]
Population t-1 1.673*** 1.847*** 1.863***
[0.401] [0.373] [0.335]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.084 -0.240* -0.186*
[0.106] [0.123] [0.099]
Skill t-1 -0.450*** -0.394*** -0.613***
[0.094] [0.096] [0.098]
Tax Rate t-1 0.283*** 0.267*** 0.367***
[0.043] [0.038] [0.055]
Investment Costs t-1 0.008 -0.183 -0.271*
[0.120] [0.150] [0.159]
Wages t-1 -0.083*** -0.108*** -0.087**
[0.032] [0.036] [0.035]
Ideology t-1 0.048* 0.059** 0.044*
[0.025] [0.026] [0.025]
Union t-1 -0.413*** -0.408*** -0.463***
[0.050] [0.043] [0.056]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 489 489
R-squared 0.962 0.956 0.949
TABLE 8
Impact of Competitor Employment Protection on Host Employment Protection (IV)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is employment protection in the host country.   The competitor's employment protection
variable is the average of employment protection in other foreign countries, which is calculated as an
unweighted average, a weighted average using the inverse of distance, and a weighted average using
affiliate sales.
45Unweighted Average Distance Weighted Sales Weighted
Competitor EP t-1 0.445*** 0.235*** 0.181*
[0.122] [0.078] [0.098]
GDP t-1 0.058 0.039 0.042
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041]
Population t-1 0.196 0.104 0.035
[0.133] [0.109] [0.118]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.067* -0.054 -0.033
[0.038] [0.036] [0.035]
Skill t-1 -0.115** -0.120*** -0.137***
[0.046] [0.041] [0.046]
Tax Rate t-1 0.052** 0.042* 0.043
[0.023] [0.024] [0.025]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.010 -0.011 -0.002
[0.067] [0.068] [0.071]
Wages t-1 -0.028 -0.026 -0.021
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Ideology t-1 -0.068*** -0.060*** -0.055**
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020]
Union t-1 0.002 -0.002 -0.006
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Host EP t-1 0.856*** 0.862*** 0.876***
[0.025] [0.026] [0.023]
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 463 463 463
Hansen J p-value 1 1 1
AR2 p-value 0.274 0.460 0.289
Implied Long-Run Elasticity:
Competitor EP t-1 3.090*** 1.698*** 1.463
[0.837] [0.555] [0.872]
TABLE 9
Impact of Competitor Employment Protection on Host Employment Protection (GMM)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is employment protection in the host country.   The competitor's employment
protection variable is the average of employment protection in other foreign countries, which is
calculated as an unweighted average, a weighted average using the inverse of distance, and a weighted
average using affiliate sales.
46EP Total t-1 -0.631***
[0.137]
EP Firing t-1 -0.977***
[0.216]
EP Hiring t-1 -0.470***
[0.132]
GDP t-1 1.921*** 1.632*** 2.258***
[0.141] [0.121] [0.253]
Population t-1 0.031 -0.407 -0.078
[0.443] [0.416] [0.515]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.823*** -0.493*** -0.838***
[0.119] [0.128] [0.131]
Skill t-1 -1.087*** -1.126*** -1.072***
[0.149] [0.167] [0.172]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.015 -0.185*** -0.001
[0.059] [0.058] [0.074]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.343** 0.089 -0.493***
[0.163] [0.190] [0.182]
Wages t-1 0.034 0.049 0.063
[0.061] [0.070] [0.064]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 477 477 477
R-squared 0.989 0.989 0.985
F-Stat, Instruments 52 54 13
Hansen J p-value 0.26 0.88 0.07
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is total foreign affiliate sales.  Different regressions include different measures of
employment protection.  Total employment protection is an average of "firing" which includes
restrictions on individual dismissals and "hiring" which includes restrictions on the hiring of temporary
workers.
TABLE 10
Impact of Different Types of Employment Protection on Foreign Affiliate Sales (IV)
Total Sales
47Host EP Total Host EP Firing Host EP Hiring
Competitor EP Total t-1 2.119***
[0.600]
Competitor EP Firing t-1 16.990
[85.986]
Competitor EP Hiring t-1 2.747***
[0.532]
GDP t-1 0.284*** -0.267 1.162***
[0.076] [1.262] [0.217]
Population t-1 1.847*** 1.387 2.129***
[0.373] [2.249] [0.774]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.240* -0.062 -0.643**
[0.123] [1.510] [0.253]
Skill t-1 -0.394*** -0.837 -0.461*
[0.096] [3.636] [0.266]
Tax Rate t-1 0.267*** -0.106 0.411***
[0.038] [0.637] [0.103]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.183 0.472 -0.619*
[0.150] [0.903] [0.336]
Wages t-1 -0.108*** 0.582 -0.229**
[0.036] [3.225] [0.107]
Ideology t-1 0.059** 0.061 0.099*
[0.026] [0.157] [0.058]
Union t-1 -0.408*** -0.140 -0.522***
[0.043] [0.779] [0.113]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 489 489 489
R-squared 0.956 0.261 0.919
F-Stat, Instruments 24.12 0.04 52.30
TABLE 11
Impact of Different Types of Competitor EP on Host EP (IV)
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.
Different regressions include different measures of competitor employment protection.  The competitor's
employment protection variable is the weighted average, using the inverse of distance, of employment
protection in other foreign countries.  Total competitor employment protection is an average of "firing"
which includes restrictions on individual dismissals and "hiring" which includes restrictions on the hiring of
temporary workers.
48Total Sales Local Sales Foreign Sales U.S. Sales
Employment Protection t-1 -0.336*** -0.060 -1.568*** -2.377**
[0.120] [0.109] [0.447] [1.074]
GDP t-1 1.735*** 2.038*** 0.848** 1.222**
[0.140] [0.140] [0.347] [0.596]
Population t-1 1.286** 0.739 3.294* 4.180
[0.642] [0.538] [1.844] [3.459]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.705*** -0.148 -2.451*** -3.287***
[0.130] [0.123] [0.393] [0.810]
Skill t-1 -1.159*** -0.662*** -2.853*** -4.278***
[0.147] [0.114] [0.521] [1.120]
Tax Rate t-1 -0.036 -0.066 0.212 -0.120
[0.051] [0.043] [0.149] [0.248]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.508*** -0.513*** -1.584*** -2.836***
[0.173] [0.152] [0.615] [0.989]
Wages t-1 -0.098 0.010 -0.496*** -0.915**
[0.079] [0.075] [0.174] [0.358]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 376 361 368 353
R-squared 0.991 0.993 0.959 0.9
F-Stat, Instruments 43 41 42 40
Hansen J p-value 0.34 0.07 0.45 0.51
TABLE 12
Impact of Employment Protection on Foreign Affiliate Sales by Destination (IV), European Sample
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is U.S. foreign affiliates sales.  The sample is restricted to European countries.  'Total
Sales' are affiliate sales to all locations, 'Local Sales' are affiliate sales within the host country, 'Foreign
Sales' are affiliate sales to other foreign countries not including the U.S. or the host country, and 'U.S. Sales'
are affiliate sales back to the U.S.
49Unweighted Average Distance Weighted Sales Weighted
Competitor EP t-1 2.069*** 1.274*** 3.960***
[0.801] [0.491] [1.015]
GDP t-1 0.365*** 0.273*** 0.422***
[0.083] [0.090] [0.104]
Population t-1 1.638** 1.682** 2.168***
[0.720] [0.718] [0.742]
Trade Costs t-1 -0.220* -0.178* -0.341***
[0.114] [0.100] [0.124]
Skill t-1 -0.442*** -0.474*** -0.663***
[0.095] [0.090] [0.123]
Tax Rate t-1 0.274*** 0.254*** 0.386***
[0.046] [0.042] [0.068]
Investment Costs t-1 -0.045 -0.082 -0.386*
[0.152] [0.158] [0.222]
Wages t-1 -0.139*** -0.152*** -0.150***
[0.040] [0.038] [0.048]
Ideology t-1 0.035 0.029 0.036
[0.028] [0.027] [0.033]
Union t-1 -0.438*** -0.447*** -0.510***
[0.054] [0.054] [0.069]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Decade FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 388 388 388
R-squared 0.957 0.956 0.931
F Stat, Instruments 46 40 24
TABLE 13
Impact of Competitor Employment Protection on Host Employment Protection (IV), European Sample
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  All variables are in natural logs.  The
dependent variable is employment protection in the host country.   The sample is restricted to European
countries.  The competitor's employment protection variable is the average of employment protection in other
foreign countries, which is calculated as an unweighted average, a weighted average using the inverse of
distance, and a weighted average using affiliate sales.
50